William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 5

Article 8

2013

Minnesota's Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes: A
Call for Change
Jenna Yauch-Erickson

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Yauch-Erickson, Jenna (2013) "Minnesota's Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes: A Call for Change," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol.
39: Iss. 5, Article 8.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Yauch-Erickson: Minnesota's Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes: A Call for Change

MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT
STATUTES: A CALL FOR CHANGE
Jenna Yauch-Erickson†
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1623
BACKGROUND ...................................................................... 1624
MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT STATUTES ...... 1626
PROBLEMS WITH THE MINNESOTA CSC STATUTES .............. 1627
A. Definitional Problems ...................................................... 1627
B. Interpretive Problems ....................................................... 1628
1. Intrinsic Force ........................................................... 1629
2. Personal Injury.......................................................... 1631
C. The Result of Overlapping Elements ................................. 1632
V. THE CSC STATUTES VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION ............ 1632
VI. SOLUTIONS .......................................................................... 1637
A. Force ............................................................................... 1637
B. Injury ............................................................................. 1638
C. Overall Restructuring ...................................................... 1639
D. My Proposal .................................................................... 1640
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1642

I.

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota criminalizes five degrees of criminal sexual conduct
(CSC). The base conduct prohibited in fifth-degree CSC is
nonconsensual sexual contact. The four higher degrees of CSC
require one or more aggravating elements in addition to a
nonconsensual sexual act. The two aggravating elements which
distinguish the degrees of CSC in Minnesota are force and personal
injury. These aggravators are supposed to separate out the worst
offenses and offenders for the harshest punishment.
But

† Jenna Yauch-Erickson is a 2011 graduate of William Mitchell College of
Law. Jenna is currently clerking for the Honorable Myron H. Bright of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Jenna would like to thank
Professor Ted Sampsell-Jones for his advice and inspiration.
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problematic statutory definitions and judicial interpretations have
created overlap in the meanings of force and injury. The same
conduct satisfies both the force and injury elements, so there is no
difference between the degrees of CSC—higher and lower degrees
of CSC prohibit exactly the same conduct. This means defendants
who engage in identical conduct can receive vastly different
sentences. As currently written and enforced by the courts,
Minnesota’s CSC statutes violate equal protection under the
1
Minnesota Constitution. The Minnesota legislature should act
swiftly to remedy this problem.
II. BACKGROUND
Courts and legislatures have long struggled to define the crime
of rape. At common law, rape was defined as carnal knowledge of a
2
woman not one’s wife, “forcibly and against her will.”
The
common law definition of rape also required that the woman resist
3
her assailant “to the utmost” of her physical capacity.
The
common law definition of rape had many problems. The utmost
resistance requirement made rape nearly impossible to prove—few,
4
if any, women could meet the high standard of physical resistance.
A definition of rape that requires any level of resistance is
problematic because it makes criminal liability dependent on the
actions of the victim, not the assailant. Also, requiring resistance
leads to difficult questions about how much resistance is enough
5
Moreover, the utmost
and what kind of resistance counts.
resistance requirement had a harmful effect on victims because it
required women to increase their risk of injury in order to prove
1. See infra Part V; see also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2; State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d
517 (Minn. 2011).
2. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906) (requiring “the
most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the woman’s
power to resist the penetration of her person,” including with her “hands and
limbs and pelvic muscles”); Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 (1998).
4. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 964. Statistics show that a very small
percentage of rape victims report fighting back against their assailants. See
MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM TWENTY YEARS
OF SURVEYING CRIME VICTIMS 30 (1993), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/bjs/144525.pdf.
5. As a first step toward abolishing the utmost resistance requirement, some
states changed their definition of rape to require “earnest resistance” or
“reasonable resistance.” See Anderson, supra note 3, at 964–66.
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they were raped and sent the message that inadequate resistance
meant there was no rape at all. Other elements of common law
rape definitions also placed a heavy emphasis on the actions and
state of mind of rape victims. For example, the elements of force
and non-consent were traditionally defined based on the victim’s
6
actions.
Feminist reforms led to significant changes in the criminal
definition of rape. For example, rape reformers fought to abolish
the utmost resistance requirement and achieved substantial
7
success.
Today, at least thirty-seven states have removed all
references to resistance in their statutory definitions of rape or
8
have specifically noted that resistance is not required.
But
definitional problems persist. In some states, resistance by the
9
victim is still an element of rape. Furthermore, “[e]ven in the
absence of a formal resistance requirement, many courts continue
to define force and nonconsent in terms of the woman’s
10
resistance.”
It is easy to critique various definitions of rape, but it is difficult
to create a rape definition that does not in some way depend on
evaluating the actions or state of mind of the victim. In some
states, the use of force above and beyond the sexual act itself is one
11
element of rape. A definition that requires force may not seem to
focus on the victim’s conduct. But often, an assailant uses force
only when a victim resists. In fact, the level of force required is
often defined as “force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will” or
12
force necessary to overcome resistance.
As such, force
requirements often double as resistance requirements. But in the
absence of a force requirement, the definition of rape turns on the
6. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986).
7. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 959, 969–74.
8. Id. at 966–67.
9. See, e.g., State v. Jones, No. 36841, 2011 WL 4011738, at *5 (Idaho Ct.
App. Sept. 12, 2011) (explaining that Idaho is one of the few remaining states to
require resistance to prove rape and that Idaho fails to specify what type of
resistance will suffice).
10. Anderson, supra note 3, at 968.
11. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)
(acknowledging that the prosecution must show physical force or threat of force in
order to demonstrate the forcible compulsion element); State v. Soderquist, 816
P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the force necessary to
constitute rape is not simply the force inherent in the penetration, but the force
used to overcome resistance).
12. Joshua Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the Various Standards of
Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1277, 1292 (1996).
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nonconsensual nature of the contact. Inquiries into the presence
or absence of consent focus on the victim’s state of mind and
create the dynamic of “he said, she said” in rape prosecutions.
There are many pitfalls in the drafting and interpretation of a
rape statute. And, as explained below, Minnesota has fallen into
some of them.
III. MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT STATUTES

13

Minnesota criminalizes five degrees of CSC crimes. The base
14
or
conduct prohibited is nonconsensual sexual contact
15
nonconsensual sexual penetration. Fifth-degree CSC, the lowest
16
The higher
degree, prohibits nonconsensual sexual contact.
degrees of CSC require additional elements. The aggravators
which drive the increase in degree are the use of force or
17
coercion to accomplish the sexual act and personal injury to the
victim. The next two degrees of CSC require force as an
aggravating element in addition to nonconsensual contact and
nonconsensual penetration, respectively.
Fourth-degree CSC
18
requires nonconsensual sexual contact and force. Third-degree
19
CSC requires nonconsensual sexual penetration and force. The
two highest degrees of CSC require injury as an aggravating
element in addition to force and nonconsensual conduct. Second-

13. Minnesota’s CSC statutes also prohibit some conduct that is outside the
purview of this article. For example, other conduct prohibited as first-degree CSC
includes sexual penetration when the victim is a certain age in relation to the
assailant, sexual penetration involving the use of a deadly weapon, and sexual
penetration of a person who is mentally incapacitated. MINN. STAT. § 609.342,
subdiv. 1(a), (b), (d), (e)(ii) (2012).
14. Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 11.
15. Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 12.
16. Id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1(1). Fifth-degree CSC is punishable by up to one
year’s imprisonment and up to a $3000 fine. Id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 2.
17. This element may be satisfied by proof of either force or coercion. See,
e.g., id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c). However, as explained below, the force element is
easily satisfied in all CSC cases. In Minnesota, proof of a nonconsensual sexual act
itself is sufficient proof of force. So by proving a nonconsensual contact or
penetration occurred, a prosecutor necessarily proves force. Therefore, even
though a prosecutor could pursue a CSC conviction based on coercion, it is
unclear why any prosecutor would choose to do so. For this reason, I refer to this
element throughout the article as a force element.
18. Id. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c). Fourth-degree CSC is punishable by up to ten
years’ imprisonment and up to a $20,000 fine. Id. § 609.345, subdiv. 2.
19. Id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c). Third-degree CSC is punishable by up to
fifteen years’ imprisonment and up to a $30,000 fine. Id. § 609.344, subdiv. 2.
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degree CSC requires sexual contact, force, and personal injury.
First-degree CSC requires sexual penetration, force, and personal
21
injury. So the statutory scheme for CSC in Minnesota looks like
this:
CSC 5
CSC 4
CSC 3
CSC 2
CSC 1

Contact
Contact
Penetration
Contact
Penetration

+
+
+
+

Force
Force
Force
Force

+
+

Personal Injury
Personal Injury

IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE MINNESOTA CSC STATUTES
As a result of problematic statutory definitions and judicial
interpretations, the force and injury aggravator elements in the
Minnesota CSC statutes overlap. The same conduct can satisfy both
elements, and thus different degrees of CSC prohibit the exact
same conduct. Instead of five degrees of CSC, Minnesota really has
something like two.
A.

Definitional Problems

Some of the problems with the CSC statutes originate in the
statutory language. It is plain from the statutory definitions that
the elements of force and injury overlap. Force is defined as
the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened
infliction by the actor of bodily harm or commission or
threat of any other crime by the actor against the
complainant or another, which (a) causes the
complainant to reasonably believe that the actor has the
present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor
does not have a significant relationship to the
22
complainant, also causes the complainant to submit.
Personal injury is defined as “bodily harm as defined in section
23
609.02, subdivision 7, or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.”
Setting aside for a moment the quantum of harm required by the
statutory definition of bodily harm, the mere fact that both the
20. Id. § 609.343, subdiv. 1(e)(i). Second-degree CSC is punishable by up to
twenty-five years’ imprisonment and up to a $35,000 fine. Id. § 609.342, subdiv. 2.
21. Id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e)(i). First-degree CSC is punishable by up to
thirty years’ imprisonment and up to a $40,000 fine. Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 2(a).
22. Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 3 (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 8 (emphasis added).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 8

1628

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

force and injury elements use the same term—bodily harm—is
highly problematic. The force element is satisfied if the assailant
inflicts bodily harm, while the injury element is satisfied if the
victim suffers bodily harm at the hands of the assailant. Using the
bodily harm standard twice ensures that both (or neither) elements
will be satisfied in every case. If a rape involves bodily harm,
inflicted by the assailant and suffered by the victim, then both the
force and personal injury aggravators are satisfied. In every case
where the prosecution can prove force based on the infliction of
bodily harm, it must necessarily be able to prove personal injury.
This overlap in the definitions of force and injury is
exacerbated by the actual definition of bodily harm. Bodily harm is
defined as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of
24
physical condition.” Any physical pain qualifies as bodily harm.
So, in the context of CSC, the infliction of any physical pain
satisfies the force element and the injury element. It is common
sense that every nonconsensual sexual act involves physical pain.
Moreover, the definition of personal injury includes mental
anguish. Even if it is possible that any nonconsensual sexual
penetration or contact can occur without physical pain,
undoubtedly the victim will suffer some mental anguish, satisfying
the injury element.
The overlapping definitions and the low threshold for
personal injury mean that in virtually every rape case, the State can
prove both force and personal injury. The crime of third-degree
CSC is essentially meaningless because successfully proving a thirddegree CSC necessarily involves proving the elements of firstdegree CSC, the only additional element being injury. Likewise,
proving the elements of fourth-degree CSC necessarily involves
proving the elements of second-degree CSC, the only difference
being injury. So any putative fourth-degree CSC can be charged as
second-degree, and every third-degree CSC can be charged as firstdegree CSC.
B.

Interpretive Problems

Separate and apart from the statutory definition problems,
Minnesota courts have interpreted the CSC statutes in ways that
eliminate any distinction between the degrees of CSC. First,
Minnesota courts have adopted an intrinsic force standard.
24.

Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7.
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Second, the courts have reinforced the minimal personal injury
requirement.
1.

Intrinsic Force

There are two different standards courts and legislatures use to
define the force element in rape laws: intrinsic force and extrinsic
25
force. An extrinsic force standard requires the use of force above
26
and beyond the force inherent in the nonconsensual sexual act.
Intrinsic force, in contrast, holds that the force inherent in the
27
nonconsensual act satisfies the force requirement. The extrinsic
force standard is “the more traditional view” and “the most
28
commonly adopted” among states. The United States Supreme
29
Court adopted an extrinsic force standard in 1897. However, the
adoption of the “[i]ntrinsic force [standard] is indicative of a
modern trend toward the eradication of the element of force” and
“is most clearly observed in recent court opinions that narrowly
30
construe sexual assault provisions in favor of the victim.”
Neither the statutory definition of force nor the way the word
“force” is used in the CSC statutes indicates whether intrinsic or
31
extrinsic force is required in Minnesota.
However, Minnesota
courts have long interpreted the CSC statutes to require only
intrinsic force. In State v. Brouillette, without announcing what type
of force standard it employed, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the defendant’s conviction for second-degree CSC was
supported by sufficient evidence of force where the defendant
grabbed the victim’s shoulders and turned her around before the
32
sexual contact occurred. There was conduct in addition to the
sexual contact—grabbing the victim by her shoulders and turning
25. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3(a) (2d ed. 2003).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Jones, No. 36841, 2011 WL 4011738, at *8 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept.
12, 2011).
29. Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648–49 (1897).
30. Fried, supra note 12, at 1294.
31. The CSC statutes state that the actor must use force “to accomplish” the
nonconsensual sexual act. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (2012).
Arguably, by requiring that force be used “to accomplish” the act, the plain
language of the statutes requires extrinsic force. Using force to accomplish an act
is different than force that merely accompanies an act. See In re D.L.K., 381
N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. 1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected this
argument. Id.
32. 286 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1979).
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her around—but no evidence that this conduct inflicted bodily
33
harm (pain), as the statutory force definition requires. In State v.
Mattson, the court also found sufficient evidence to support the
force element, based on the defendant grabbing the wrist and
breast of the victim and pulling the victim partially into his car
34
through an open window. The court did not explain what kind of
force standard it applied. In Mattson there was evidence that the
victim felt pain, but it was unclear whether it was the act of
grabbing her wrist or grabbing her breast (or both) that caused the
35
pain. Brouillette and Mattson suggested that intrinsic force satisfies
the force element in Minnesota. Neither case involved the clear
infliction of bodily harm in addition to the sexual conduct—at
least, the court did not isolate the pain caused by the sexual contact
from any other pain suffered by the victims—and still the court
upheld both convictions.
The court more clearly adopted the intrinsic force standard in
36
In re D.L.K. D.L.K. approached a female classmate, tapped her on
the shoulder, and when she turned around, grabbed and pinched
37
her breast hard enough to cause her pain.
The only forceful
conduct inflicting bodily harm in the form of pain was the sexual
38
contact itself, pinching the victim’s breast. The court held that
the nonconsensual sexual contact was by itself sufficient force to
39
The court rejected D.L.K’s
satisfy the CSC force element.
argument that the statute drafters intended to create an extrinsic
force standard by requiring that force be used “to accomplish” the
sexual act and instead determined that the force element is
33. When Brouillette was decided, the statutory definition of force referenced
the statutory definition of assault. However, because the definition of assault
included the infliction of bodily harm, the force definition that applied in
Brouillette is consistent with the current force definition. Although there was no
allegation of bodily harm in Brouillette, the opinion suggests that the force element
may have been satisfied instead by the defendant’s act causing fear of harm in the
victim.
34. 376 N.W.2d 413, 414–15 (Minn. 1985).
35. It is likely that the act of grabbing the victim’s wrist and pulling her
through an open car window caused her pain in addition to the pain from the
sexual act of grabbing her breast. Thus it is likely that the facts in Mattson would
have satisfied an extrinsic force requirement as well.
36. 381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986).
37. Id. at 436.
38. Id. at 437.
39. Id. at 438 (“[W]e have found the requirement of force in . . . [CSC
crimes] satisfied when the actor inflicts bodily harm or pain or the threat thereof
on another while accomplishing sexual contact.” (emphasis added)).
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satisfied when the actor uses force “while accomplishing” the
40
The court concluded that the “sudden and painful
contact.
grabbing and pinching of the victim’s breast is sufficient use of
force to accomplish sexual contact,” although that use of force was
41
one and the same as the sexual contact itself.
There are reasonable arguments in support of an intrinsic
force standard. An intrinsic force standard recognizes that
nonconsensual sexual acts are inherently forceful and that those
acts involve some physical pain. Undoubtedly, the Minnesota
courts chose an intrinsic force standard out of concern for rape
victims. But judicial adoption of an intrinsic force standard is
problematic in a state where force is an aggravating element. In
the context of Minnesota’s statutory scheme for CSC, the intrinsic
force standard means we have an aggravator that is essentially
meaningless and a resulting overlap in degrees of CSC. The
addition of the force element is the only difference between fifthdegree CSC and fourth-degree CSC. But because the intrinsic
force standard will always be satisfied by nonconsensual sexual
contact, there is no distinction between fifth-degree CSC and
fourth-degree CSC.
2.

Personal Injury

Minnesota courts have also reinforced the low standard for the
injury element. The courts have explained that minimal injury is
42
sufficient to satisfy the personal injury element of CSC. As long as
a victim testifies that she felt pain, the personal injury element is
43
satisfied.
Any injury that “weakens or damages an individual’s
physical condition” is also sufficient to satisfy the personal injury
44
An injury “need not necessarily be coincidental with
element.
actual sexual penetration” to satisfy the personal injury element but
45
needs “only be sufficiently related to the act.”
The Minnesota
Supreme Court has acknowledged that only a “minimal amount of
physical pain or injury” is required to satisfy the personal injury
46
element.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 438.
See State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981).
See id.
State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003).
State v. Sollman, 402 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. 1987).
Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d at 522.
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The courts have confirmed that the personal injury element
has a very low threshold. The personal injury element will be
satisfied in every case involving a nonconsensual sexual act.
Nonconsensual sexual acts necessarily involve pain or mental
anguish, either of which can constitute bodily harm. The only
difference between third- and first-degree CSC is the addition of
the aggravating element of personal injury. The same is true of
fourth- and second-degree CSC. Because the injury element will be
satisfied in every case, by proving third-degree CSC, the state can
necessarily prove first-degree CSC and likewise, by proving fourthdegree CSC, the state can necessarily prove second-degree CSC.
C.

The Result of Overlapping Elements

To prove fifth-degree CSC, the state has to show a
nonconsensual sexual contact. Because the contact, by itself,
satisfies the intrinsic force requirement, the exact same act satisfies
all the elements of fourth-degree CSC because the only additional
element is force. Moreover, that exact same sexual contact will
undoubtedly involve either some pain to the victim or some mental
anguish or both, thus satisfying the injury element—the only
additional element of second-degree CSC. One act can just as
easily satisfy the elements of second-degree CSC as fifth-degree
CSC. Similarly, the act of sexual penetration accomplished by force
that is required for third-degree CSC necessarily establishes firstdegree CSC. The only additional element of first-degree CSC,
personal injury, will be satisfied by the same evidence that
demonstrated force, or by the penetration itself. Thus, the CSC
statutes in Minnesota really look more like this:
CSC 5
CSC 4
CSC 3
CSC 2
CSC 1

Contact
Contact
Penetration
Contact
Penetration

+
+
+
+

Force
Force
Force
Force

+
+

Personal Injury
Personal Injury

V. THE CSC STATUTES VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
The overlap described above leads to significant sentencing
disparity. Two defendants who commit identical acts can receive
drastically different sentences, based only on charging decisions of
the prosecutors. For example, the exact same conduct can lead to
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a charge and conviction for either first-degree CSC or third-degree
CSC. As explained above, proving the elements of third-degree
CSC (penetration, force) will always entail proving the only
additional element of first-degree CSC (injury). A defendant
convicted of third-degree CSC can be sentenced to fifteen years’
imprisonment. Another defendant who engages in the exact same
conduct but is charged with first-degree CSC can receive thirty
years’ imprisonment. That is a sentence twice as long based on no
discernible difference between the defendants or their conduct.
The CSC statutes place significant power in the hands of
prosecutors. Nonconsensual sexual contact can be charged as
either fifth-, fourth-, or second-degree CSC. And nonconsensual
sexual penetration can be charged as either third- or first-degree
CSC. A trio of cases demonstrates the significant prosecutorial
47
48
discretion in charging CSC crimes. State v. Mattson, In re D.L.K.,
49
and In re A.A.M. involved nearly identical conduct: the defendant
grabbed the victim’s breast. In each case, the victim testified that
she experienced pain. The defendants’ convictions were upheld in
each case. And yet each was charged with a different degree of
50
CSC. Mattson was charged with second-degree CSC; D.L.K. was
51
adjudicated delinquent based on fourth-degree CSC; A.A.M. was
52
There are
adjudicated delinquent based on fifth-degree CSC.
some differences in the facts of these cases. For example, Mattson,
who was charged with the highest degree of CSC of the three,
grabbed his victim such that she was pulled through an open
53
window of his car. However, the sexual contact in each case was
exactly the same. The minimal injury requirement and the
intrinsic force requirement combine so that one act can be charged
in three different ways and result in three vastly different
punishments. This potential for unfairly disparate sentences is an
equal protection violation.
Minnesota’s CSC statutes have been upheld against
constitutional challenges for vagueness and due process
54
violations.
But no Minnesota appellate court has yet assessed
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

376 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1985).
381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986).
684 N.W.2d 925 (Minn. 2004).
Mattson, 376 N.W.2d at 414.
In re D.L.K, 381 N.W.2d at 436.
In re A.A.M., 684 N.W.2d at 927.
See Mattson, 376 N.W.2d at 414.
See State v. Reinke, 343 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. 1984); State v. Lattin,
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whether the CSC statutes deny equal protection of the laws. The
Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed Minnesota’s equal
55
protection doctrine in State v. Cox. Cox was charged with issuing a
56
She filed a motion to dismiss the charges,
dishonored check.
arguing that sentencing disparity between the crimes of issuing a
57
dishonored check and theft by check violated equal protection.
Although issuing a dishonored check is a lesser-included offense of
theft by check, in some circumstances, based on the value of the
checks at issue, issuing a dishonored check is punishable by a
58
harsher sentence than theft by check. The value of the checks in
Cox was $515.83, which was a felony under the issuing a dishonored
check statute but would have been a gross misdemeanor under the
59
theft by check statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that Cox’s equal
protection claim turned on whether Cox could demonstrate that
60
she was similarly situated to persons treated differently.
To
determine whether two groups are similarly situated, the court asks
61
whether they are “alike in all relevant respects.”
In a case
challenging sentence disparity in criminal statutes, “the critical
62
factor is whether the two statutes prohibit the same conduct.”
“[A] statute violates the equal protection clause when it prescribes
different punishments . . . for the same conduct committed under
63
the same circumstances by persons similarly situated.”
In
assessing the challenged statutes, the court asks whether the
64
elements of the statutes are “the same or essentially similar.” In
sum,
[I]n order for a defendant to prevail on an equalprotection claim based on the disparity in sentencing for
two different offenses, the defendant must first show that
a person who is convicted of committing one offense is
similarly situated to people who are convicted of
committing the other offense. In order to demonstrate
336 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1983).
55. 798 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 2011).
56. Id. at 518.
57. Id. at 519.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 520.
60. Id. at 521.
61. Id. at 522.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2002)).
64. Id. (citing Frazier, 649 N.W.2d at 837).
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this, a defendant must show that the two statutes prohibit
the same conduct because the specific conduct of the
65
defendant would support a conviction for either offense.
66
In Cox, the court began its analysis by comparing the two
challenged statutes, issuing a dishonored check and theft by
67
check. The court next considered whether Cox’s conduct would
68
have also supported a conviction for theft by check. The court
concluded that Cox’s conduct would not have supported a
conviction for theft by check because theft by check had a different
69
mens rea requirement than issuing a dishonored check. Theft by
check required the state to prove that the defendant had
fraudulent intent, whereas issuing a dishonored check required the
state to prove that the defendant intended that the check not be
paid, which can be proven by showing that the defendant failed to
70
The facts alleged in the
respond to notices of nonpayment.
complaint supported the latter mens rea, because Cox failed to
respond to notices of nonpayment, but did not show that Cox had
71
any intent to defraud, as required for theft by check. The court
held that Cox’s conduct would not support a conviction for theft by
check, and so she had not proven that she was similarly situated to
72
a person convicted of theft by check.
Under the standard applied in Cox, the CSC statutes violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Take for
example first-degree and third-degree CSC (although the exact
same argument is true of the comparison of second-, fourth-, and

65. Id. at 523 (citation omitted).
66. The court noted that Minnesota has “not always followed federal law in
interpreting our state Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 521 (citing State v. Russell,
477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991)). As Justice Stras noted in his concurring
opinion, there is some uncertainty about how courts evaluate equal protection
claims under the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 525 (Stras, J., concurring). This
may be because “the Minnesota Constitution, unlike the United States
Constitution, makes no mention of Equal Protection rights.” Id. at 526; see also
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or
deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”). However, the majority in Cox
reaffirmed Minnesota’s unique equal protection jurisprudence and analyzed Cox’s
claim without reference to federal equal protection law.
67. Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 523.
68. Id. at 524.
69. Id. at 523–24.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 525.
72. Id.
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fifth-degree CSC). To survive an equal protection challenge, the
state must show an actual difference between the statutes—a mere
73
“theoretical” difference is insufficient.
First- and third-degree
CSC prohibit the exact same conduct. It is true that first-degree
74
CSC requires one additional element, personal injury. However,
this does not mean there is an actual difference between the two
statutes.
Any difference is merely theoretical.
Although
theoretically first-degree CSC requires the state to prove an
additional element, the element of personal injury will necessarily
be satisfied in every successful prosecution for third-degree CSC.
These statutes create precisely the situation the court wrote about
in Cox: the same conduct, under the same circumstances,
committed by defendants in similar circumstances can lead to
different penalties. The exact same conduct would support a
75
conviction for either offense. In any case of nonconsensual sexual
penetration, the state can prove the elements of first-degree CSC
just as easily as the elements for third-degree CSC.
At least one Minnesota court has already declared the CSC
statutes unconstitutional. Defendant Jamie Ray Beach successfully
challenged his sentence for first-degree CSC by arguing that firstand third-degree CSC prohibit the exact same conduct and thus
76
violate equal protection principles.
A Dodge County court
agreed, finding that Beach’s sentence for first-degree CSC “is
repugnant to individual protections guaranteed under our state
77
and federal constitutions.”
In light of Beach’s success, other
defendants have raised equal protection challenges to the CSC
statutes, and this issue is currently being litigated. Should a
Minnesota appellate court ever agree with Dodge County, the
consequences would be far-reaching. An appellate court ruling
that the CSC statutes violate equal protection would apply to every
defendant awaiting trial on CSC charges, every CSC conviction on
direct appeal, and every CSC conviction not yet final, until the

73. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
74. MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e) (2012).
75. The only way the State can argue that these statutes do not prohibit the
same conduct is to demonstrate that it is possible to have a third-degree CSC
without injury. To do so, the State would have to argue that it is possible to have
an act of nonconsensual penetration where the victim experiences no pain or
mental anguish.
76. Order at 1, State v. Beach, No. 20-CR-09-780 (Dodge Cnty. Dist. Ct. June
6, 2012).
77. Id.
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legislature acted to change the law. Additionally, it is possible that
such a ruling could have retroactive application and serve as
78
grounds for collateral attack on CSC convictions.
Potentially,
every prisoner serving a sentence for a CSC conviction could
petition the courts for post-conviction relief. Scores of CSC
offenders could be released from prison or qualify for a reduction
in sentence.
VI. SOLUTIONS
The Minnesota legislature should amend the CSC statutes to
remedy the definitional overlap between force and injury, the
merging of the degrees, and the attendant sentencing disparity.
There are many potential solutions. The legislature could amend
the CSC statutes to redefine force and injury to eliminate the
definitional overlap. Additionally or alternatively, the legislature
could change the statutory structure and reduce the number of
degrees of CSC crimes.
A.

Force

The legislature could adopt an extrinsic force standard and
amend the definition of force in the CSC statutes to require the use
of force above and beyond that inherent in the nonconsensual
sexual act to satisfy the force element. This would provide a partial
solution that would differentiate fifth- and fourth-degree CSC. If
the force element required infliction of harm beyond that inherent
in the sexual act, proof of the sexual act alone would no longer
satisfy both the act element and the force element. Fourth- and
fifth-degree CSC would be distinct crimes. However, if the new
extrinsic force requirement continued to define force as bodily
harm, the overlap between the force element and injury element
would remain. Even if Minnesota adopts an extrinsic force
standard, as long as force and injury are both defined as bodily
harm, the sentencing disparity between second- and fourth-degree
CSC and first- and third-degree CSC would still violate equal
protection.
Minnesota courts have demonstrated that they find an
78. A ruling that the CSC statutes violate equal protection would not be
procedural in nature, so the Teague doctrine restricting the retroactivity of new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure would not apply. See Danforth v. State,
761 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 2009).
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79

extrinsic force requirement distasteful.
An extrinsic force
requirement can tilt the focus of rape cases too much toward the
victim’s resistance and trivialize the obvious use of force inherent in
all rapes. Minnesota’s current statutory scheme expresses a policy
decision that nonconsensual sexual contact accomplished by force
is more serious than nonconsensual sexual contact without any use
80
of force.
The legislature could also decide to abandon this
distinction, perhaps in recognition that all nonconsensual sexual
contact is forceful, and eliminate force as an aggravator. But if the
legislature chooses to maintain the distinction and keep force as an
aggravator, force has to mean something more than nonconsensual
sexual conduct.
B.

Injury

The legislature could additionally or alternatively change the
definition of injury. A heightened injury standard would ensure
that there is some difference between second- and fourth-degree
CSC and between first- and third-degree CSC. Injury cannot be
used as an aggravator if it is defined as any physical pain. Physical
pain is inherent in the very nature of rape. Furthermore, the
definition of the harm required for the injury element must be
different than the harm required for the force element. If not,
both elements (or neither) will be met in every case. One model
for levels of harm already exists in the Minnesota Statutes. There
are three levels of harm defined in section 609.02: bodily harm,
81
substantial bodily harm, and great bodily harm. The legislature
could easily import these definitions into the CSC statutes, in any
number of ways. The legislature could use these heightened levels
of harm to redefine extrinsic force and/or injury. For example,
79. See In re D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435, 437–38 (Minn. 1986).
80. Again, based on the intrinsic force standard, it is impossible to have a
nonconsensual sexual contact that does not involve force. But the structure of the
Minnesota CSC statutes assumes that a difference is possible.
81. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7 (2012) (“‘Bodily harm’ means physical
pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”); id. § 609.02,
subdiv. 7a (“‘Substantial bodily harm’ means bodily injury which involves a
temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
which causes a fracture of any bodily member.”); id. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (“‘Great
bodily harm’ means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or
which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or
other serious bodily harm.”).
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the legislature could amend the CSC statutes to state that force
requires the actor to inflict substantial bodily harm as defined in
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 7(a), or that injury
means great bodily harm as defined in Minnesota Statutes section
609.02, subdivision 8. As long as a different quantum of harm is
required for each element, the aggravators would not overlap.
Alternatively, the legislature could create a structure where the
degrees of CSC correlate to different levels of injury, with
substantial bodily harm representing one degree and great bodily
harm representing a higher degree.
C.

Overall Restructuring

These suggestions could work in conjunction with a
restructuring of the CSC statutes and a reduction in the number of
degrees of CSC. The purpose of a structure with several degrees of
the same crime is to provide harsher punishment for more
objectionable conduct. Minnesota’s CSC statutes represent several
policy decisions about what conduct to punish most harshly. CSC
crimes involving penetration are punished more harshly than those
involving contact. CSC crimes involving the use of force by the
assailant are punished more harshly than those where force is not
present. And CSC crimes where the victim suffers injury are
punished more harshly than those where the victim is not injured.
These distinctions are only theoretical in Minnesota because the
legislature and the courts have made it impossible to separate out
the worst crimes and criminals. Every CSC crime involving
penetration can be punished at the first-degree level. And every
CSC crime involving contact can be punished at the second-degree
level. The Minnesota legislature needs to ensure that the different
degrees of CSC prohibit different conduct, some punishable more
harshly than others. By eliminating the sentencing disparity
resulting from the current overlap, the legislature can also ensure
that the worst offenders are punished most harshly.
There are myriad ways the legislature could restructure the
CSC statutes. But, to achieve the goal of eliminating sentencing
disparity, any restructuring must bear in mind two key principles.
First, if Minnesota maintains an intrinsic force requirement, force
cannot be an aggravating element. Second, if injury is defined as
physical pain, it cannot be an aggravator. One potential revision
could consist of a base offense (say third-degree) defined as
nonconsensual sexual acts. Second-degree could contain the
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additional element of extrinsic force. And first-degree could add
the element of injury, as long as the definition of injury requires a
level of harm higher than that required for the force element.
Another option, which mirrors the current differentiation of
sexual contact and sexual penetration, could involve two crimes:
one prohibiting nonconsensual sexual contact and one prohibiting
nonconsensual sexual penetration. Force and injury, properly
defined, could serve as aggravators for each crime. A particularly
simplistic approach would be to remove considerations of force
and injury altogether and define CSC as nonconsensual sexual
contact or penetration and nothing more.
D.

My Proposal

First, the legislature should eliminate force as an aggravator
for CSC crimes. Second, the legislature should amend the CSC
statutes to create two separate injury aggravators, defined as
substantial bodily harm and great bodily harm, respectively. The
legislature should maintain the separation of sexual contact and
sexual penetration. But to simplify the statutory structure, the
legislature should treat nonconsensual sexual contact and
nonconsensual sexual penetration as different crimes instead of
different degrees of the same crime. The lowest degree of each
crime should prohibit the nonconsensual sexual act (contact or
penetration), the next highest degree should include the
aggravator of substantial bodily harm, and the highest degree
82
should include the aggravator of great bodily harm. The revised
CSC statutes would look something like this:
Nonconsensual Sexual Contact
Third Degree
Contact
Second Degree
Contact
First Degree
Contact

+
+

Substantial Bodily Harm
Great Bodily Harm

Nonconsensual Sexual Penetration
Third Degree
Penetration
Second Degree
Penetration
First Degree
Penetration

+
+

Substantial Bodily Harm
Great Bodily Harm

82. The legislature may include other aggravators that are outside the scope
of this article, such as the use of a dangerous weapon and knowledge that the
victim is mentally incapacitated.
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This proposal for a simplified CSC structure would be easy to
apply in practice and, most importantly, would fix the equal
protection problem of sentencing disparity resulting from
overlapping degrees of the current CSC statutes. Yet I believe this
proposal is true to the underlying principles of the current CSC
statutes. The force and injury aggravators show that Minnesota
wanted to punish most harshly perpetrators who cause the most
harm to their victims. Minnesota attempts to single out for higher
punishment perpetrators who use force and cause personal injury
to their victims. But any hierarchical system of rape statutes with
higher punishments for higher degrees rests on an uncomfortable
assertion: some rapists should be punished more harshly than
others, which must mean that some nonconsensual sexual acts are
worse than others.
Understandably, the Minnesota legislature and courts are
reluctant to make such an assertion, even if it is embedded in the
statutory structure. Instead, Minnesota lawmakers and judges have
emphasized a different truth: Every single nonconsensual sexual act
is forceful and causes pain or mental anguish to the victim. Every
nonconsensual sexual act is a horrendous violation of the victim
and should be punished harshly. I wholeheartedly agree.
The point of my proposed changes is not to make it harder for
prosecutors to obtain CSC convictions. The legislature must always
tread carefully in this area and must not revert to the common law,
where rape was nearly impossible to prove. But Minnesota has
gone too far the other way. Well-intentioned people have
unwittingly made missteps in pursuit of a noble goal—supporting
rape victims, in part by ensuring conviction and punishment of
their rapists. The problem with the current CSC statutes is not
simply that it is easy to prove the aggravating elements of
heightened degrees. The problem is the resulting sentencing
disparity that ultimately could lead to convicted rapists being freed
from prison.
We have chosen to draw lines in Minnesota, and these lines
have to mean something. The problems discussed above prevent
any distinction among perpetrators and victims. My proposed
changes would ensure that perpetrators who cause the most harm
to their victims are punished most harshly. But my proposal does
not prevent the legislature from punishing even third-degree
nonconsensual contact and penetration at a high level. Making
these distinctions and drawing these lines is emotionally difficult.
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But if we are to live by the rule of law, meaningful lines must be
drawn.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota CSC statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution because different degrees of
CSC prohibit the exact same conduct. The statutes prescribe
different punishments for the same conduct committed under the
same circumstances by persons similarly situated. There are
numerous ways to fix the problem. No matter how the legislature
chooses to remedy the sentencing disparity, it must ensure that the
degrees of CSC prohibit different conduct. Any aggravators in the
statutory scheme must be distinct. The Minnesota legislature must
act swiftly. One court has already found the CSC statutes
unconstitutional. A similar ruling from an appellate court could
effectively invalidate the sentences of scores of prisoners with CSC
convictions. And until this problem is solved, every defendant
currently serving a sentence for a CSC conviction could challenge
the sentence on equal protection grounds, seeking a reduction in
sentence.
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